이 웹 사이트는 쿠키를 사용합니다. 이 웹 사이트를 사용하고 탐색함으로써 귀하는 이러한 쿠기 사용을 수락하는 것입니다.
종료
FlightAware 항공편 추적이 광고로 지원된다는 것을 알고 계셨습니까?
FlightAware.com의 광고를 허용하면 FlightAware를 무료로 유지할 수 있습니다. Flightaware에서는 훌륭한 경험을 제공할 수 있도록 관련성있고 방해되지 않는 광고를 유지하기 위해 열심히 노력하고 있습니다. FlightAware에서 간단히 광고를 허용 하거나 프리미엄 계정을 고려해 보십시오..
종료
Back to Squawk list
  • 98

Airliner Automation

제출됨
 
I’m often asked about the all-mighty autopilot and how truly capable the system is at flying the aircraft. We’ve all heard the saying that “airplanes practically fly themselves these days”, but little is known about the pilot workload behind managing and monitoring the automation systems on board today’s commercial aircraft. The automation used is extremely accurate, even more so in many cases than the pilots hands themselves. However, an autopilot can do an incredibly precise job of maintaining an undesired state. Thorough interfacing by the flight crew and knowing when manual intervention is necessary is crucial.

Surprisingly, one of the highest phases of workload for pilots occurs right at the gate prior to departure. It’s here that the automation systems are fed the information they need in order to assist in navigating a particular flight. After powering up the aircraft and performing various systems checks, the flight crew enters information into an onboard computer called a flight management system, or FMS. The FMS links various information fed by the pilots, such as the route and altitude to be flown, to a flight director system. The flight director system in turn provides various visual cues via instrumentation for the pilots and/or autopilot to follow for proper aircraft guidance. Once in flight, various levels of automation can be engaged that will reduce pilot workload.

The most basic level of automation begins with what we call “raw data”. This involves manually flying the aircraft with the absence of the autopilot and all flight director cues. The highest level of automation involves complete aircraft control in terms of speed, altitude, and direction. Often pilots will use a combination of these levels, such as manually flying the aircraft while following the guidance of a flight director. Some situations require more automation, while others require less.

Regardless of the level of automation being used, it is vastly important for the pilots to monitor the state of the aircraft in all phases of flight. Past accidents, attributed to the use of automation, may have been prevented had pilots been aware of problems being masked by the autopilot. Case is point, many years ago, ice accumulation on the wings of a regional turboprop aircraft formed beyond the reach of the aircraft anti-ice systems. The ability for lift to be produced with such ice build-up was hindered dramatically. The autopilot did a fantastic job of maintaining the assigned altitude up until the point of an aerodynamic stall. The autopilot system is smart, yet it can be inept. The system is similar to a balloon being filled by an air tank; the tank makes filling a balloon much easier, but it doesn’t know when to stop before popping the balloon. It takes manual intervention at a certain point to control potential chaos. Manually flying the aircraft in these conditions would have revealed a sensation of abnormal control loading, which would have alerted the pilots of a problem. The autopilot, masking this high load on the flight controls, worked right up to the point that it could no longer hold the aircraft steady. This situation highlights the importance of pilot situational awareness and knowing when automation can become the enemy. Pilots are trained to keep a hand on the control yoke at lower altitudes during autopilot use to detect unusual forces that would otherwise go un-noticed.

In today’s airline environment, workload management is a key topic discussed during annual training. Concepts such as this all stem from the origins set forth decades ago by United Airlines through their Crew Resource Management concept, or CRM. The precedent set fourth here touted the concept that the captain was the end-all-be-all entity on the flight deck. CRM stresses the importance of flight crews working together in unison in all phases of flight, be it an emergency or not. Workload management is a tactic crews use to handle complex situations that can often arise simultaneously. For example, at airports that utilize multiple, closely spaced runways, a precise means of aircraft separation after takeoff is necessary. Aircraft are assigned departure routes that must be followed both laterally and vertically with extremely close tolerances. Coupling that demand with other post-takeoff tasks such as radio communication, aircraft configuration changes, and monitoring engine instrumentation, can quickly maximize the capacity of the pilots. Throw in an engine fire, and there isn’t much room to accommodate the additional workload. In this case, as in many others, the autopilot plays the role of a third crewmember by freeing up the hands of a capable pilot to manage other tasks.

The advances in aircraft automation have made it possible for aircraft to go as far as landing themselves. Alongside such strides has been the advancement in indication systems that alert pilots of a problem. It’s these warning systems that prompt the decision to increase or decrease the level of automation being used. However, a computer cannot replace the complexity and capability of the human brain to react to dynamic situations that only manual flying can handle. I’m sure the pilots who manually guided their highly automated Airbus into the Hudson River would agree!

Sort type: [Top] [Newest]


jeffnielsen
I'm one of the "old guys" (shoot, WHEN did that happen? Seems like yesterday I was a new co-pilot) flying for a major "legacy" carrier, and I am getting very concerned about the newer generation of pilots I've been flying with. Their reliance on automation is unsettling. Perhaps it's because they have grown up in a world of flat screen panels and Flight Management Systems, and that's all they know.

Your story reminds me of the time I was called in on Reserve to fly ATL-MKE on the MD-88. Our Inertial Reference system kept crashing as we were pushing back from the gate, and every time we got it up and running, it crashed again. I told the FO not to worry, these things fly just fine using VORs and airways. He looked at me like I was an alien from outer space! I called Dispatch and had them refile us non-RNAV, and we taxied out to the runway. The FO was feverishly attempting to revive our Inertial Reference system, and as we were cleared into position, it finally "came back to life." I still chuckle about that episode... I mean, HE didn't even have to fly it, as it was MY leg!

Dan remarked that "even at the commercial level, testing the pilots ability to "hand-fly" is a major portion of annual training." Well, many years ago that was true at my airline. As the years have ticked by, more and more emphasis has been placed on leaving it "hooked up" most of the time, with the exception of engine failures at V1 on takeoff and the required "hand-flown" visual approach.

Bottom line: As Dan made clear in his excellent article, and Wayne has reiterated, automation is a TOOL to help relieve or shift some of the workload. It is imperative that we pilots still KNOW HOW to fly the plane.
preacher1
Daniel: it is a fine artical and very informative AND right on the mark. It gives a lot of insight into day to day realities. Looking at Sparkie's comments, it drives home the point that there will never be total agreement between mx and flight crew.lol You both have good points and obviously he has seen enough of what he speaks to form that opinion. Unfortunately, there are probably some in our ranks that fit that bill. I would hope that he has seen or will see some of the other side. Sad part is that me and you both know that the industry is heading that way, Jeff's comment below. I glad I'm out of it, full time anyway.lol
GateHold
My own take on this:

http://www.askthepilot.com/chapter-4/#c4-q17


The essay above is from the manuscript to the second edition of my book. A modified version of the essay was published recently on the Freakonomics blog, and another version is scheduled to run in Popular Science magazine.

PS
benthurston
Actually it was NOT an unrecoverable stall--the pilot held it in a stall all the way down. At several points he released back pressure momentarily, the airspeed increased, and the stall warning stopped. But it's clear from the transcript that the pilot's entire focus was on the descent rate; so rather than allowing the nose to come down and fly out of the stall, he maintained back pressure all the way to the water in an attempt to end the descent.
Culturedpearl1
Excellent article! Thank you.
ACI222
Electronics is a wonderful machine, but will remain a machine, nothing does not replace the human decision
airbusp
HI ALAIN. THANK YOU THAT IS TRUE. THE PILOTS ARE THE BEST.
bayinstructor
Don Imus 0
Thanks Dan. I always like to say I have never met a pilot better than I am but have met many autopilots who can kick my *ss. Good explanation about what they can do and why they don't do everything. That said, I am known to glance at the sports section and the FA's entire "offering" due to the wonders of this technology.
philliploposser
"The autopilot system is smart, yet it can be inept. The system is similar to a balloon being filled by an air tank; the tank makes filling a balloon much easier, but it doesn’t know when to stop before popping the balloon."

Quite possibly one of the best explanations of AP I've ever heard. Extremely well written.
usaerin
@ Wayne Bookout --

Some guys are born to wear cuff links; you were born to be decked out in torque links.
preacher1
Well, sombody's got to play the devil's advocate.lol.
canuck44
canuck44 0
Good article...just remember all the same principles apply to "robotic surgery" which is highly promoted (advertised). If someone offers you a procedure touting a robot, it is only as good as the human operator and all the same rules of experience, judgment and ability to intervene when needed apply.
SWEATINTHSWAMP
So. My simple mind begs a question. Can AP take over the aircraft at the gate, taxi to TO and TO without assist from pilots? Reverse on landings?
gortmull
I've never been anything more than a passenger on an aircraft and find this article excellent and highly informative.

I have a question regarding last year's uncontained engine failure on the Qantas A380. When that occurred, multiple alarms went off in the cockpit, close to the point of being overwhelming, and it was determined that having additional pilots on board for training purposes helped to arrest the situation. Let's assume only the normal flight crew (2 in an A380?) were in the cockpit at the time of the engine failure. Would the automated systems have been able to assess and take control of the situation without pilot input?
preacher1
From the words of the flight crew themselves: "Had there not been 5 senior captains on that flight, the outcome would have been much different".In answer to your main question, I think not because most of the automated systems were alarming themselves. Best I remember, 1 was flying the plane and the others were running down checlists and alarms.
gortmull
Timing is everything goes the old saying. How fortunate they were to have the additional captains along for the ride that day.

Thank you for your response Mr. Bookout!
noof25
noof25 0
I would just like to point out that the Colgan air crash was not due to icing. The NTSB report actually states that there was "7. The minimal aircraft performance degradation resulting from ice accumulation did not affect the flight crew’s ability to fly and control the airplane." Rather it was "6. The captain’s inappropriate aft control column inputs in response to the stick shaker caused the airplane’s wing to stall." In this case it was the captain pulling throttle to flight idle which allowed the airspeed to bleed dangerously low.

Otherwise, a good article about how too much reliance on atuopilot can be dangerous
DanielFahl
Daniel Fahl 직원 저자 0
Thanks for the insight. I'm not referring to the Colgan accident in this article though. I'm actually referring to the crash of an ATR aircraft in 1994. In some ways it could be argued that it was in fact a LACK of automation involved in the chain of events leading up to the Colgan incident. Thanks for reading!
noof25
noof25 0
my mistake... sounded quite similar to colgan... I know there were thoughts initially about how it could've been autopilot masking the symptoms of heavy icing.
preacher1
Jordan: Don't feel bad. About everyone has forgotten about those ATR's. After that Eagle pulled most of them back into the South, while not really announcing it, on account of that. I personally hate them things, both as PAX or pilot, and if one good thing is to come out of this AMR bankruptcy, it is that most of them are slated to go away.
kadriver
kadriver 0
This is also what occurred to the Circuit City Citation at KPUB. The engines were at flight idle upon leveling off from a decent to commence the approach and never brought back up.
I just finished initial at FSI for the G550 and must say that I should have pursued a degree in computer science. The kids coming up from the Xbox generation should not have such a hard time.
kadriver
kadriver 0
descent
sparkie624
It was 100% crew fault. They were using the A/P when they were told by the manuals and training NOT to do so. The Crew did not recognize the amount of ice build up on the plane, and when it stalled, they did not recognize the stall, but instead thought it was a system fault. NO Autopilot Fault Here. 100% Crew Error.
DanielFahl
Daniel Fahl 직원 저자 0
What accident are you referring to here?
sparkie624
Colgan in Buffalo
DanielFahl
Daniel Fahl 직원 저자 0
Sparkie, crew fault yes, everything else you are saying is 100% false. Icing had nothing to do with this accident. Please, out of respect for everyone involved in this tragedy, do your research before making such claims. I'll let you make your own discovery as to how far off-base your claims are about what caused this accident.
DanielFahl
Daniel Fahl 직원 저자 0
Fair enough, that was a rough reaction. Please read my response below your youtube linked post for further info.
sparkie624
I am laughing, because I have looked up the facts and you have not. How do you explain stall warning identification.
DanielFahl
Daniel Fahl 직원 저자 0
I think we're drifting apart on what our disagreement is. That's why I'm citing you to read what I wrote below. I'm clear on what occurred during the aerodynamic stall and the incorrect reaction to it by the crew.

What I'm respectfully disagreeing with you on is that ice was NOT the major contributing factor in what lead to the stall. Again, read my post below.

The handling of the final moments is one discussion. What LED to those final moments is another. That is the source of your misunderstanding, not the stall. If you are interested, click on my name and shoot me an e-mail. I'll be happy to expand on this with you further.
genethemarine
Thank you Sparkie..
Be safe up there.
The weather here is always - aluminum overcast.
bevdal
I am a very old 'retarted' military pilot who was taught instrument flying with the 'needle, ball and airspeed' system. Late in my career I flew SAC tankers and our autopilot systems were not the greatest. Most of used the system only at crise altitude. You pilots today fly above most of the bad weather but still contend with clear turbulence. The recommended altitude for penetrating weather areas was 8000 feet above sea level. We went off autopilot in turbulence and picked our way through weather with sometimes unreliable radar. Hit by lightning twice and needless to say, we earned our money. I just want to say how much I envy you pilots with all your modern equipment which is great while its working but don't every forget that you are the pilot. Bud Daley
preacher1
Gordon, most flying today wouldn't have an idea what to do without Doppler, but most don't even realize it wasn't around prior to 84 and the 1011 crash at DFW. Damn that seems like yesterday and makes me feel old too.lol.
airbusp
HI GIRLS AND BOYS. I LOVE AIRCRAFT BUT I I ALL WAYS LIKE TO THE PILOTS ARE FLYING.
usaerin
@ Wayne Bookout --

You do a pretty good job of being 'devil's advocate'...I also like what I think is your favorite mantra: When all else fails, put your hands on the yoke and fly the airplane and you'll probably get to where you're tryin' to get to.
preacher1
preacher1 -1
IMHO: Regardless of the automation that is there to make life a little easier, if you don't have the personal capability to fly it out, duration of the trip, and fly it back in, you have no business being in the seat.
colinpayette
Tell that to the next astronaut you see. Used properly, automation can add safety.
sabre45
I always enjoyed an occasional short leg like ATL-MEM because I'd hand fly the whole leg - just for the practice. My F/Os would usually say, "I've never thought of doing that!" Hopefully they take advantage of such opportunities now.
preacher1
Joe: I am semi retired off a big iron corporate job, but still do fill in. I very much agree with you. See my comment above from 3 days ago.
Flyintravel
I most say I do enjoy what I just read here. Thank for shearing with us.
titi577
titi577 0
Very good explanation of how the auto pilot work and the inportance of the pilot in the cocpict and the work load that he has cope with. Thank you for your article.
houtxpilot
I fly the Airbus A320 for a major airline here in the US. The Airbus is a fantastic, highly automated aircraft. Someone had posted something about whether or not the autopilot will mask icing conditions. I have been in some serious ice on the Airbus, however the way Airbus' are built, at least the A320, makes it so that ice doesn't accumulate like on smaller aircraft. As a matter of fact, we have no anti ice protection on the tail of the airplane, this is because the way the aircraft is designed, it doesn't collect ice on the tail. If I remember right from days of yore, flying the EMB145, the masking of icing conditions by the autopilot is more prevalent in T tail airplanes and can mask the symptoms of a tail plane stall.
Flyintravel
Yes I always love Airbus. I am a safety coordinator with a company at JFK airport Terminal-One and be for I had this position I was a ground handling lead loading and offloading baggage and cargo in in my 11 years working there I have seen more people get hurt in the cargo compartment of a Boeing aircrafts then in an Airbus aircraft and that one of the many reason I love Airbus. I love the way Airbus build there plane because they did not build there plane to be safe only for the pilots that fly the aircraft and the passenger that inside the cabin, but they build it safe also for the people that work around and in the cargo compartment.
preacher1
I like the stress that the automation is there to be used and RELIEVE or shift some of the workload, not necessarily replace it. In other words, you still got to know how to FLY THE PLANE. A couple of weeks ago, while doing a fill in for DAL, KMEM-KATL and back on one of their ragged 9's, not far out of KATL coming back, for whatever reason, we lost the AP completely. No big deal; everything else worked so we just hand flew it back to KMEM. FO told me that his regular Captain would have turned back to KATL, and declared Emergency. Different strokes I guess.
tbpera
Tom Pera 0
just as long as you don't go "head down" during an emergency and forget to fly the airplane.... unfortunately,
most of the old "fly by the seat of their pants" guys are gone... give me a military pilot with "upset training" not a computer systems operator....
preacher1
Tom: the old guys are going away, as you say, but I have seen several different industries in which the ones that will make it will know everything there is to know about the piece of equipment they are operating, and then there are some that don't have an interest in knowing anymore than what it takes to get it down the road, rail, or up/down in the air; haven't read up on them any to know about any little quirks or idiosyncracies. In any piece of equipment, I want sombody at the controls that flies or drives that thing like it is part of them. Most do, but the ones that don't are the ones we'll read about.
preacher1
Flying a plane, and I am sure Daniel will agree, whether it is a c150 or a b767, is by and large, a pleasurable experience. If it isn't you need to find another hobby or line of work. That being said, an uneventful flight is a beautiful thing but you need to continually have in the back of your mind that the potential for an upset of some kind is always there, and hope your training/reaction is basically automatic and good enough to handle it accordingly. As I have said before, there are hundreds of incidents tucked away in airline's files where pilots have made textbook recoveries. We never hear about those. All we read about are the ones that didn't.
DanielFahl
Daniel Fahl 직원 저자 0
Excellent commentary.
HunterTS4
same thing happened to me on SW outta TPA for SUS.....we actually did turn around and land at TPA.....
sparkie624
As being an Avionics Tech for over 27 years now, and have worked on CAT II and CAT IIIa and CAT IIIb systems. They are good systems with a lot of fail safe redundancies. I cannot think of ONE incident where these systems caused an aircraft incident. Crews also have to be trained as the systems routinely audited and checked. A/P is a great system, the only bad part is sometimes I think crews rely on them too much. When I have to defer one, crews get grumpy most of the time.
DanielFahl
Daniel Fahl 직원 저자 2
I don't believe anyone here is blaming these "CAT" systems on an incident, so please clarify where you're coming from here if you don't mind.

I'd be bummed if the autopilot was deferred on my aircraft as well, it's a pain in my side when a new level of workload is added. Sure, I'm capable of hand-flying in place of the autopilot, quite good at it actually.

With that said, I respectfully disagree with your stance that your experiences with "grumpy crews" is a sign of their reliance on automation. I'm sure you'd be grumpy if your screwdriver was broken and you had to use your finger nail instead, right? Same concept.
sparkie624
I am not sure that would be quite the same concept. All that I am saying is that the systems are multi fail redundant... When I say they rely on them too much, I think that crews should be required to do more hand flying. When crews are using their a/p when the book says no... that is too dependant. Whe you use it so much that you do not recognize that the a/c is in a stall. that is too dependant. These happen. Airbus in France, Colgan in Buffalo. If crews were hand flying, those accidents probably would not have happened. Airfrance was supposed to be on A/C because of being in RVSM. Colgan crew per book was supposed to have a/p off, and they did not.
DanielFahl
Daniel Fahl 직원 저자 2
With all due respect, I think you are so far off base with your comments here, I don't even know where to begin responding. I don't think you are aware of the pilot training system in place when you throw these statements around as if they were fact.

I'll address one such comment made by you above. Again, as I mentioned earlier, RVSM airspace requires an operable autopilot to be INSTALLED on the aircraft, not necessarily ENGAGED.

Crews are required to hand fly the aircraft in plenty of situations, and often they choose to manually fly the aircraft in normal everyday operations. To make a blanket statement that the Air France accident was solely caused by the complacency of the crew is inaccurate. It may have been a factor, but there are many MANY other issues at play with this accident.

What are you referring to when you say the Colgan crew was "supposed to have the autopilot off"? And in general when you say things like "using the autopilot when the book says so" is a very tough comment to digest because in your intent you dispute the point of my article.

I think you have the right thoughts your mind that in general you are making a valid point that complacency is bad, etc... It's just that your understanding of pilot training and policy is slightly flawed. I'm not trying to call you out here to be mean, it's just extremely important, as a matter of fact what inspired me to write this very article, that I address the school of thought you have.
sparkie624
The FDR and CVR both showed the Autopilot of COLGAN Disengaged. It is heard verbally that it was engaged. The Stall Warning went off, A/P auto disconnected like it was supposed to and stick pusher shoved the stick forward to recover. The captain grabbed the yolk and pulled back forcing the plane into a full unrecoverable flat spin. Colgan's Pilots Operating Handbook calls for on approaches to hand fly the approach with autopilot OFF! Printed in bold letters. Crew disobeyed. Bombardier says A/P off for that situation. As a result the crew was not aware of the ice build up until far too late. The FDR and I think CVR audio is at:

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vMy8kZ2_TMs&feature=related

As for the Airbus, I cannot say if the A/P was on or off. Facts we do know is that there were 2 co-pilots flying, and the Captain was off the flight deck. I would assume that the A/P was on, as they seemed to be flying fairly comfortably. FDR data confirmed a lot of facts that show the plane was still flyable, but due to misdiagnoses from the crew they failed to do what was necessary to keep it flying. If the Captain had been on the flight deck at the time, things may have been different.

I am aware that there is a lot of training for pilots, especially in that of CAT II. Sometimes, I think things get a little too relaxed. I think that computers have in many cases taken over too many tasks. Sometimes the automation has taken out thinking in many cases. I had a captain one time called me up and said he had low oil pressure, and as me (Maint Control) what to do, I told him to follow his checklist (Standard Answer that I cannot get in trouble with). He said, but it says to bring the throttle to flight idle. I then told him that I just he do so. Then it went from a caution to a warning, ended up diverting him, inflight shutdown, and lost all but 3 quarts of oil.

My advice to the pilots is simple. Follow the Check Lists and provided manuals in the cockpit. It is illegal for me in maintenance control to trouble shoot the plane when you are flying with passengers on board. I cannot have you to reset circuit breakers, or anything like that. It is just plane illegal. If the book says land nearest acceptable airport, then I suggest you do so... I cannot fix or have it fixed in the air. Sorry about that.. The experts who get paid a lot more than I do make those decisions.

The use of the term complacency, everyone is subject to it. Pilots, Mechanics, all of us and we need to be more aware of it. I am not talking about one or two or all pilots, but a lot will fight flying an plane if the A/P is broken. I have had (at more than one airline) refer them or talk to the chief pilot. It is a legal defer, and some of them will not fly with out it. Pilots need a minimum time of hands on stick time, and a lot are not getting it.
DanielFahl
Daniel Fahl 직원 저자 1
Sparkie, I'm enjoying this lively discussion. I really do appreciate your interest in the flight operations side of things.

I want to make sure you understand that the accident I'm referring to in my article is NOT the Colgan accident. As long as you realize that, then I'll assume you are brining up the Colgan accident as a seperate discussion.

I agree with you 100% that many of the accidents being discussed are no doubt linked in some way to the pilots themselves. There seems to be an alarming trend when it comes to the reaction of the flight crews during aerodynamic stalls. That's for sure. Another thing that is for sure, is that the airline training folks are reacting to this by requiring more exposure in the simulator to these situations. I can attest to this fact.

I want it to be known to the other folks reading here, that may not be as accute to this complex subject, that there are many factors that lead up to an accident. There is ALWAYS a chain of events that consists of many weak links that lead to a horrific outcome. YES the crew mis handled the stall in the Colgan accident, but that's not all there is to the story. What got them into the stall in the first place? It wasn't ice. The autopilot was engaged during the descent into BUF. As the aircraft automatically leveled off, the pilots forgot to advance the power levers that were near-idle during the descent. So the speed began to bleed off to a point of the stick shaker. This is the first indication of a stall on the aircraft and very quickly it worsened into the pusher where the aircraft tries to prevent a stall on its own. YES the autopilot disengaged as you said. From here on, you are correct that the pilots mishandled things from here on.

It could be argued that the use of the autopilot was beneficial to the exhausted flight crew (read more on their days schedule leading up to the incident) in that it lessened their workload. It could be further argued that had Auto-throttles, another component to autopilot systems normally found in larger aircraft, been installed, the airspeed would have never bled-off in the first place.

Botttom line is, this is a very complex discussion that could be talked about at length.
preacher1
Very well said, young man.lol
preacher1
Being from the old school, all the CAT systems are great. Just as alluded to in previous posts, they require a gut check and they sure increase the pucker factor. Any incidents I remember are after somebody gets on the ground in those conditions. Crews have come to rely on the AP. When you defer it, they have to hand fly the plane and work a little more.lol
EmeraldRocket
Daniel I realize you are writing about automation for commercial airliners and professional pilots. For those of us in GA who fly IFR in the soup (not on a daily basis) we should exercise caution about over-reliance of this automation. As you know it can break and you guys can simply hand fly it. For GA pilots who fly a lot less frequently (and some fly quite often so this doesn't apply) we should practice both. And when we are in the soup we should ask ourselves "how well could I fly this (approach) if the A/P went out". Just a thought. Again, not a concern I have when flying in the back of a 121 carrier but one I have when flying up front in a bug smasher.
HunterTS4
here here!
DanielFahl
Daniel Fahl 직원 저자 0
Excellent point, Shawn! Stick and rudder skills must be kept fresh. Even at the commercial level, testing the pilots ability to "hand-fly" is a major portion of annual training. Many airline pilots fly manually on a regular basis. I'd say it's common for hand-flying through around 10,000' feet followed by autopilot engagement up until crossing the final approach fix inbound at the destination. This of course is a generalization.
genethemarine
Excuse me but as a ground pounder...didn't the last crash overseas involve
1. Auto pilot left on - then the stalled out - then it was too late to pull up?
Fly by wire vs. Auto pilot = disaster when they left the cockpit ?
Thank you.
sparkie624
If you are talking about the airbus I am sure it was at that altitude. They were in RVSM airspace (29,000-41,000) which requires a/p to be engaged. If it is INOP or MEL then they would have been required to decent below 29,000 feet. That problem was a pitot static problem (Again a problem with crew recognition). Stalled the plane, and unrecoverale stall all the way down. Bad part with both crashes here, is that if the crews were on top of the situation and not been complaisant they would be here today. Again.. Crew Error. What a lot of people do not realize is that there are computers that drive computers that monitor computers to verify that the computer that is doing the actual work is doing it correctly. It is one of the crews job to make sure something does not go haywire, and when it does, quickly return it to manual operations.
benthurston
Actually, the pilot held the plane in a stall all the way down. At several points he released back pressure momentarily, and airspeed increased and the stall warning ceased. However, it's clear from the transcript, available on-line, that the entire focus was arresting the descent; so instead of relaxing back pressure, flying out of the stall, and THEN addressing the descent, he held the plane in a mushing stall with an AOA of 40 DEG or more all the way to the water.
DanielFahl
Daniel Fahl 직원 저자 0
Just a side note; operation in RVSM requires an operable autopilot to be installed on the aircraft, but it doesn't necessarily have to be turned on. It's highly encouraged, and is policy at many air carriers, but the point is that RVSM airspace does not require a/p to be engaged.
preacher1
Yeah, I think a couple of weeks ago when I lost mine on that DAL 9 coming out of KATL to KMEM I was headed for FL340; hadn't made it there yet, but they dropped me clear down to 240 for the remainder of the flight.
sparkie624
You got it. No A/P, No RVSM. Sorry.. Burn a little more gas.
sparkie624
Our manuals says they have to use it in RVSM airspace.
preacher1
He was talking about the CAT systems not having incidents, not the AP. Like Daniel talked about in this article, the AP worked fine on the ATR, right up to the point where it could no longer maintain, looked at the pilot, clicked off and said "YOUR AIRCRAFT". Not sure which crash you are referring to but, it is not an automatic feature of the AP to turn itself off and on.lol. Humans still have to make the inputs.
sparkie624
Bingo "Humans still have to make the inputs."
bayinstructor
Don Imus 0
Hey Sparkie, get a life. Seriously. It seems Mr. Fahl is playing nice with you and you seem to be the grumpy one. How many turbine hours do you have PIC? Just wondering.
sparkie624
I am mtc, in particular mtc control. I have flown jump many times. I have read the tapes from FDR's....

로그인

계정을 가지고 계십니까? 사용자 정의된 기능, 비행 경보 및 더 많은 정보를 위해 지금(무료) 등록하세요!