Weston, Imagine this scenario: A pilot has been trained that a stall-protection feature exists that will activate Nose Down trim when the Captain's AOA vane senses near-stall conditions. Later, in flight, the pilot sees the trim running spurts of Nose Down adjustment. The pilot knows from the thrust setting and deck angle (Especially in visual conditions) that the airplane is not in danger of a stall, but he can see the AOA indicator showing its false reading. It then becomes immediately obvious what the problem is - and the solution. In the current reality, the pilot can only *guess* at what might have gone wrong and may well be overloaded with multiple warning noises and lights due to the erroneous AOA. Does it seem that an AOA indicator might have some value?

(Written on 2018/12/21)(Permalink)

Well - we KNOW that's not true. I guess UAL CEO and ALPA-United MEC are just more macho than the rest of the world's 737 pilots. If I recall correctly, when the 1st gen 737 had the Hard-Over Rudder issue that attitude didn't serve UA so well....

(Written on 2018/12/21)(Permalink)

Yep - that's a good point, vecto4 !

(Written on 2018/12/17)(Permalink)

Correct. And if they were qualified on non-MAX versions of the 737 they would expect that pulling back on the yoke/column would stop the nose-Dow electrical trim. But on the MAX that column cutout switch does not work when the flaps are up. In addition to the noisy clatter the pilot can see the large pitch trim wheels on either side of the pedestal spinning.

(Written on 2018/12/17)(Permalink)

Bead Window - Bead Window - BEAD WINDOW !!

(Written on 2018/12/17)(Permalink)

Some years ago US airlines DID write their own Manuals for Boeing airplanes, but after a few litigated accidents in which the airplane company claimed that the manuals did not comply with the manufacturer’s specifications, the airlines switched to using the Boeing-written manual exclusively. That meant that if Technical and test pilots at the airline believed that some aspect needed additional documentation or details, that information could not be included in the official manual. Bulletins and notices could address the items of concern, but of course, they do not retain the legacy of the official aircraft manual. Note the “Speed Trim” verbiage in the copied information from HighFlyers link below. THAT information was in the official Boeing 737 NG (and I strongly suspect MAX), but the MCAS information was not. It certainly makes on wonder “Why Not” . From HighFlyers link: >> Pitch trim is applied to the stabilizer. Trim can be applied by electric trim switches, autopilot or a m

(Written on 2018/12/17)(Permalink)

On the Boeing 737 (like the 707 and 727 before) have a VERY audible and visual indication of pitch trim motion. In fact, the pilot can even put his hand on the trim wheel and restrain it to some degree. On the flight previous to the accident Lion Air flight the pilots used the manual handle to adjust the pitch trim after the electrical trim was disengaged.

(Written on 2018/12/17)(Permalink)

Very good point, Bill. And yes - the 737 NG/MAX all have AOA display “available” in the options list. AA and DL did buy it but UA and SW did not. I would guess that a Boeing did not charge SW much to turn on the PFD display of AOA!

(Written on 2018/12/17)(Permalink)

Yes - “Departure Time” is determined automatically when the brakes are released at pushback. This cannot be changed without extraordinary measures. I think Peter is simply stating that the schedule planners are including all expected delays after gate departure which may well be different for varying times of the day.

(Written on 2018/12/17)(Permalink)

I have to agree with Todd that your post is very hard to decipher due to its format. Your terms reflect the fact that you have worked in the airlines. But you fail to address the question of *Scheduling* which is NOT set by ACARS reporting times, but instead is determined by the planners based on their intent to improve On Time ratings.

(Written on 2018/12/17)(Permalink)