Qantas jet drama reinforces seatbelt warnings

Well, it's 3 years old. Airbus corrected the problem long before this report, and only 3 times in 28 million hours. Pilots did as they were supposed to and flew the plane, recovering from the upset. what is puzzling and in my mind, bear more investigation. All 3 happened to Qantas aircraft and off the West Coast of Austraila. That's puzzling and seems a little more than coincidence. AB is not the oly company that use NG ADIRU's.Had the pax done what we are all told when we fly, keep the belts on, there probably would not have been as many injuries.

Was the plane in a thunderstorm?

When was the last time you watched the safety breifing or looked at the card or the nearest exit? Most people are too busy with I pods and reading material. Keep the belts on.

I don't know if the original squawk I posted several days ago has been seen, as it doesn't appear on this page. When the first brief newspaper report of the ATSB final report came out, I posted the link to it, and a key extract about the algorithm.
There are two important findings buried in the document which has publicly been reported as concentrating on the importance of keeping seat belts fastened. The first is that the algorithm Airbus used to interpret AOA data being fed to the ADIRU failed to cope with unexplained spikes in the data. The algorithm was incompetent (my words) and has been re-written by Airbus. The second important, but problematic point which the ATSB could not resolve, was what caused the spikes. There is no Bermuda Triangle off the coast of Western Australia (anymore than there was in the Atlantic off Florida). But there is a powerful very low-frequency U.S.naval communications station in the area - the Harold Holt facility named after a former prime minister - which is a vital link in U.S. communications with its nuclear submarines in the Indian Ocean. Signals from this station were obviously a suspect, as all three incidents occurred in the same proximity, and all to Qantas aircraft (two to the same aircraft). The ATSB concluded that the signal strengths from Harold Holt, and from a high-frequency communications station at North West Cape were not sufficient to affect the ADIRUs:
"The naval communication station transmitted at a very low frequency (VLF) of 19.8 kHz, and the transmission power was about 1 megawatt using an omni-directional antenna. The station was transmitting at the time of the three data- spike occurrences. However, it was considered extremely unlikely that these transmissions had any effect on the ADIRUs."

Although it could not establish a link, no doubt the inconclusive finding will leave the door open to much speculation.